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TAXATION-POPERTY-AsssmENT OF LEAsEHoLD INTERESTS IN
PUBLICLY-OWNE LANDs FOR PURPOSES OFT Ad Valorem PROP-
IrTY TAX-VALUE NOT TO BE REDUCED BY .TE EXTENT OF INDEBTED-
NEss.-Pier 67, Inc. v. King County, 78 Wash. Dec. 2d 48, 469 P.2d
902 (1970).
Plaintiff, a lessee of state-owned, tax-exempt harbor land,1 brought
an action to recover personal property taxes paid under protest to
defendant county Plaintiff contended that defendant county was
obliged to follow the long-standing rule that the value of: a leasehold
of tax-exempt real property for ad valorem property tax purposes
equals its benefits less its burdens, including mortgage indebtedness
and rent reserved.2 The trial.court found for the plaintiff and ordered
the leasehold reassessed. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed.'
The standards used by the defendant county in reassessing .the lease-
hold were then challenged by the plaintiff on substantially the same
grounds. The trial court once again found for the plaintiff and the
defendant county appealed. The Washington Supreme Court, over-
ruling a line of precedent, reversed. Held: leaseholds of tax-exempt
land4 are properly assessed by determinimng their market value using
the same standards employed in assessing property generally with no
deductions allowed for rent reserved or mortgage indebtedness. Pier
67, Inc., a/k/a Edgewater Inn v. King County, 78 Wash. Dec. 2d 48,
469 P.2d 902 (1970).
The ad valorem property tax in Washington is limited by the state
constitution to provide that all taxes on the same class of property
shall be uniform and that all non-exempt property. in the state shall
be assessed-at.fifty percent of its true and fair value i-money 5 R.C.W
§ 84.40.030 requires the assessor to value each piece of property "at
1. State and federally owned property as well as that of counties, school districts,
and other mumcipal corporations are constitutionally exempted from tax liability in
Washington. WAsr. CoNsT. art. VII, § 2.
2. "Rent reserved" refers to that portion of the rent for the entire term which has
yet to be paid.
3. Pier 67, Inc., a/k/a Edgewater Inn v. King- County,- 71 Wn. -2d 92, 426 P.2d 610
(1967).
4. Hereinafter a leasehold of tax-exempt land will also 'be referred to iimply as a
"taxable leasehold." The term is appropriate in view of the theory of unit assessment
under which the possessory leasehold interest in non-exempt property is not subject to
direct taxation. See text accompanying notes 12-16, fra.
5. WAsr. CoNsT. aft. Vii; §§ 1, 2.
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such price as he believes the same to be fairly worth in money at the
time such assessment is made."0 The section further specifies that "the
true cash value of property shall be that value at which the property
would be taken in payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor." Be-
yond this the statute does not prescribe the method of assessment, and
in practice the assessor uses one or more of three conventional methods
of property valuation: 7 the comparative market data approach;I the
cost approach; 9 and the income approach."
Additional considerations arise in dealing with property under a
lease agreement creating both possessory and reversionary interests.
R.C.W. § 84.40.030 provides that "taxable leasehold estates shall be
valued at such price as they would bring at a fair, voluntary sale for
cash."" This provision applies only to leasehold interests in tax-exempt
property, however, since the Washington Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized the rule of unit assessment 2 which provides that where both
lessor and lessee are non-exempt, the assessment is based on the entire
estate 3 and charged automatically to the lessor.14 Although the state
does not apportion the tax between the possessory and reversionary
interests the burden is nonetheless indirectly distributed by means of
the lease agreement,"8 the lessee's share being reflected in the amount
6. VAsii. RaV. CODE § 84.40.030 (1961).
7. See 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 136. For administrative guidelines in Washington see
WAsH. ADMIN. CODE § 458.12.305 (1969).
8. Valuation using the comparative market data approach is based on recent sales
data for similar property. See 1 J. BONBRET, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) ; 1968
WAsH. U.L.Q. 136, 141.
9. Under the cost method of valuation, the value of the land is added to the original
cost of improvements less depreciation. See 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 136, 142.
10. Chief justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court explains the income
method as follows:
According to this method, the value of property is the sum of anticipated future
installments of net income from the property, less an allowance for interest and the
risk of partial or no receipt. . . . "It involves a capitalization or discounted valuation
of the realized or prospective net monetary income derivable by continuous exploita-
tion rather than by resale" 1 Bonbright, The Valuation of Property, p. 230.
De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544, 556 (1955).
11. WAxSHr. Riwv. CODE § 84.40.030 (1961).
12. See Trimble v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 102, 116 P. 647 (1911), aff'd, 231 U.S. 683
(1914); Alaska Land Co. v. King County, 77 Wn. 2d 247, 461 P.2d 339 (1969).
13. WASH. ADMINr. CODE § 458.12.325 (1969).
14. Id. The justification for unit assessment lies in the advantage to the state in being
able to enforce the tax against a single party, the lessor, by means of a lien on the
property. See Keesling, Property Taxation of Leases and other Limited Interests, 47
CALr. L. REv. 470, 476 (1959).
15. Trimble v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 102, 104, 116 P. 647, 648 (1911).
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of -rent he pays. A taxable leasehold, therefore, is one which must be
taxed directly because the lessor is exempt. In this event the rule of
unit assessment places the entire tax liability upon the primary lessee,"6
with sublessees, if any, carrying their share of the burden by private
arrangement.
Two issues involving the assessment of taxable leaseholds were
raised by the Pier 67 controversy. The first was a question of the
county's right to assess improvements on leased land rather than the
leasehold itself. The second and more notable issue involved the
standards of valuation to be used in the event the leasehold itself is
assessed. The misunderstanding surrounding these issues stems largely
from R.C.W. § 84.04.080, Washington's statutory definition of per-
sonal property for tax purposes. This statute is an aggregation of
numerous small parts passed from time to time to meet specific legisla-
tive ends and recodified in 1961. The portions of interest in the
principal case are these:
"Personal property" for the purpose of taxation, shall be held
and construed to embrace and include ... all leases of real prop-
erty and leasehold interests therein for a term less than the life
of the holder; [and] all improvements upon lands the fee of which
is still vested in the United States, or in the state of Washington;
*.. Provided, that.., no deduction shall hereafter be made or
allowed on account of any indebtedness owed.
Considering the provisions of R.C.W. § 84.04.080 chronologically
one begins with the provision enacted in 1891 which classifies as tax-
able personal property "all improvements upon lands the fee of which
is still vested in the United States, or the state of Washington. ' 18 In
the principal case it formed the basis of the county's contention that
it had the right to tax improvements made by the plaintiff at their
cost in lieu of taxing the leasehold itself. The Washington Supreme
Court, however, reviewed the section together with other sections of
the same revenue act and decided that the legislature had intended to
include as separate taxable personal property only those improvements
16. Clark-Kunzl Co. v. WVilliams, 78 Wash. Dec. 2d 59, 64, 469 P.2d 874, 877 (1970).
17. Ch. 15, § 84.04.080, [1961] Wash. Sess. Laws 1100-01, now codified as WAS..
REv. CODE § 84.04.080 (1961).
18. Ch. 140, § 3, [1891] Wash. Sess. Laws 280.
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on tax-exempt land which-were "in the possession. of a homesteader or
a vendee of the state."' 9 Since the interests of a vendee or homesteader
are clearly distinguishable from those of a lessee, the court rightly
concluded that the county could tax only the leasehold itself.2"
In 1906 Moeller v. Gormley2 brought before the Washington Su-
preme Court a challenge of King County's right to levy any tax what-
ever on the lease of state-owned tideland in Seattle. The court ruled
that those portions of article VII, section 2 of the Washington constitu-
tion which exempt state property from taxation were not meant also
to exempt a leasehold of state land which vests the lessee with rights
and privileges amounting to private property. The court held, how-
ever, that rather than being taxed as personal property the lease was
to be assessed as real estate since it was an "interest in lands."2 In
classifying taxable leases as real property the court foresaw difficulty
because of the inadequacy of enforcement procedures under existing
laws," but the legislature responded the next year by unequivocally
making "all leases in real property and leasehold interests therein"
personal property for tax purposes.2 4 Although these actions of the
court and legislature were intended to cover only leaseholds of tax-
exempt lands, the wording of the statute is categorical, and has from
time to time been interpreted as authority for avoiding the unit assess-
ment rule.2" This view, however, has been clearly and consistently re-
jected by the Washington Supreme Court" and we are left with the
conclusion that only leaseholds of tax-exempt land, as distinguished
from leaseholds generally, are subject to direct ad valorem taxation
specifically as personal property.
The second major question, that of which valuation standards were
to be used in assessing taxable leaseholds, first reached the Washington
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County,27 the first
19. Pier 67, Inc., v. King County, 78 Wash. Dec. 2d 48, 53, 469 P.2d 902, 906 (1970).
20. Id. at 54, 496 P.2d at 907.
21. 44 Wash. 465, 87 P. 507 (1906).
22. Id. at 469, 87 P. at 508.
23. Id.
24. Ch. 108, § 1, [1907] Wash. Sess. Laws 206.
25. Clark-Kunzl Co. v. Williams, 78 Wash. Dec. 2d 59, 61, 469 P.2d 874, 876 (1970).
26. Id. at 63, 469 P.2d at 877; Alaska Land Co. v. King County, 77 Wn. 2d 247, 253,
461 P.2d 339, 343 (1969).
27. 62 Wash. 409, 113 P. 1114 (1911).
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of four cases dealing with -the .University.-of Washington's.old camnpus
in downtown -Seattle.23  Plaintiff, lessee of the state-owned tract,
brought the action to prevent the county from valuing the leasehold
by measuring lessee's investment over the duration of the term. The
lease up to that time had proven unprofitable and plaintiff sought to
have the assessment based on present actual value. The court held
for the plaintiff, saying:29
In determining the worth of a leasehold, the courts have univer-
sally held that it is the value of the term less the rent reserved.
The value of the term is fixed with reference to present as well as
prospective conditions, not speculative, but actual.
In the second and third Metropolitan Bldg. Co. cases,30 decided in
1911 and 1913, the court added a further reduction allowance for
mortgage indebtedness to the valuation formula in apparent contradic-
tion to an explicit statutory prohibition of deductions for indebtedness.
The last sentence of R.C.W. § 84.04.080, enacted in 1907, before the
first Metropolitan Bldg. case, provides that "no deduction shall here-
after be made or allowed on account of any indebtedness owed."'"
This statute was ignored by the Washington Supreme Court until the
fourt and final opinion dealing with the Metropolitan Tract, in re
Metropolitan Bldg. Co. 32 In that case the court acknowledged that
the meaning of the statute was an issue, but refused to modify the
doctrine developed in the three earlier cases, reasoning that deduction
for indebtedness could still be validly allowed as a shorthand means
28. Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 62 Wash. 409, 113 P. 1114 (1911). See
fn re Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 144 Wash. 469, 258 P. 473 (1927); Metropolitan Bldg. Co.
v. King County,- 72 Wash." 47, 129 P. 883 (1913); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King
County, 64 Wai. 615,- 117 P. 495 (1911). -
29. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 62 Wash. at 410, 113 P. at 1114 (1911).
30. See note 28, sulra.
31." WASH. REV. CODE § -84.04.080 (1961). Both the origin and purpose of this "no-
deduction" provision are frequently misunderstood. The clause quoted in the text did not
appear specifically in response to the problem of assessing taxable leaseholds. Rather it
developed as a corollary to the rule that mortgages and certain other intangible interests
are not treated as personal property for tax purposes. Deduction for the indebtedness of
a mortgagor is inappropriate where the mortgagee is not taxed on his intangible interest
under the mortgage agreement. This is made more apparent upon consideration of both
portions of the.proviso which qualifies W.ASHr. REv. CODE,§ 84.04.080 (1961):
Provided, that mortgages, notis, a'ccounft, tEertificates of deposit, tax certificates,
judgments, state, county, municipal and taxing district bonds and warrants shall not
be considered as property for the purpose of this title, and no deduction shall here-
after be made or allowed on account of any indebtedness owed.
32. 144 Wash. 469, 258 P. 473 (1927).
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of amortizing the lessee's investment in improvements which, when
completed, become the property of the state.33 Thereafter the issue
did not come before the state supreme court until the first Pier 67,
Inc. appeal in 1967. At that time the court reaffirmed its earlier posi-
tion allowing the deduction, stating simply that the last Metropolitan
Bldg. Co. case post-dated the statutory "no-deduction" provision and
was therefore a valid precedent.3 4
In the principal case the Washington court reversed the lower court
finding that the plaintiff's leasehold had no value because net earnings
were temporarily exceeded by the sum of rent and mortgage payments
due, and expressly overruled the Metropolitan Bldg. Co. cases and
the first Pier 67, Inc. case, which had been decided only three years
earlier. The court held that the Metropolitan Bldg. Co. cases had mis-
taken a lessee's equity, which is useful in determining damages in
eminent domain proceedings, for the taxable value of the use and
possession of the leasehold throughout the remainder of the term.
Since the property tax is properly levied on use rather than profitabil-
ity no deduction should be made except for burdens which directly
and particularly affect use, such as zoning restrictions. The court
further indicated that although R.C.W. § 84.40.030 does not require
the use of a particular method of valuation, the no-deduction provi-
sion of R.C.W. § 84.04.080 is sufficiently clear to demonstrate that the
legislature did not approve the valuation standard used in the Metro-
politan Bldg. Co. cases.35 In an effort to clarify the matter the court
stated that the remaining life of the lease, and renewal rights were the
kinds of factors to be considered in the valuation process. The chief
responsibility for determining market value continued to rest with the
assessor, however, and his determination, the court held, would not
be upset unless there existed overvaluation so gross as to amount to
fraud."
The decision to abandon the standards formulated in the Metro-
politan Bldg. Co. cases is sound. Several other states have taken
33. Id. at 476-77, 258 P. at 476.
34. Pier 67, Inc., a/k/a Edgewater Inn v. King County, 71 Wn. 2d 92, 97, 426 P.2d
610, 613 (1967).
35. Pier 67, Inc., v. King County, 78 Wash. Dec. 2d 48, 56-57, 469 P.2d 902, 908
(1970).
36. Id. at 58, 469 P.2d at 909.
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similar steps in recent years,87 and the trend toward eliminating special
treatment for taxable leaseholds has received favorable comment.38
Moreover, a liberal reading of the uniform taxation provision of the
Washington constitution leads to the conclusion that special assess-
ment standards for taxable leaseholds are inappropriate.
A problem with the holding which causes some uneasiness however,
is the implicit assumption that under the earlier assessment standard
leasehold taxpayers enjoyed an actual economic advantage which
could equitably be withdrawn by changing the assessment standards.
Unfortunately this assumption is not universally true. The rents now
paid may reflect the value of the former tax advantage, and the lessee
may be unable to apportion his new tax burden among his sublessees.
In short there may not have been any actual economic advantage to
withdraw. The short-run fairness of the principal case, then, can only
be measured by asking, as to individual leases, who actually benefited
under the earlier standard and whether they or someone else should
assume the newly imposed burden.
Looking at the question from this perspective one would typically
hope to find a situation in which the state's lessee pays rent roughly
equal to the rent payments minus indirect taxes paid by the lessee of
comparable private property. In such a case only the lessee (and his
sublessees) would have been the beneficiary of reduced taxes under
the old standard and would have operated with an economic advantage
over the lessee of similar private property. It is true that fixed sublease
agreements may present difficulties in distributing the new burden
between lessee and sub-lessees. The rule of unit assessment requires
the state to tax the principal lessee and allow the burden to fall as it
may according to private arrangement. Until the sublease agreements
can be modified the total burden will fall upon the principal lessee.
A more difficult situation arises where the state's lessee has agreed
to pay a higher rent because of anticipated tax benefits. Here the state
or a particular public lessor has shared in the economic advantage
37. See Bade v. Drachman, 4 Ariz. App. 55, 417 P.2d 689 (1966); Texas Co. v. Los
Angeles County, 52 Cal. 2d 55, 338 P.2d 440 (1959); De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of
San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955); People ex. rel. Kucharski v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 43 III. 2d 174, 251 N.E.2d 225 (1969); Portland General Elec. Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 249 Ore. 239, 437 P.2d 827 (1968).
38. See, e.g., Keesling, Property Taxation of Leases and other Limited Interests, 47
CALW. L. Rav. 470 (1959); 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 136. .
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under the old valuation scheme by collecting rent in excess of what
the property itself, exclusive of tax considerations, is worth. 9 It is
of questionable fairness to hold lessees in this situation to payments
of inflated rent under contracts entered into prior to the second Pier
67, Inc. decision, while also requiring them to pay the additional tax.
Aware of the problem of fairness, the Washington legislature has
acted to delay, until the assessment year 1973, the full impact of
Pier 67, Inc. House Bill 493, enacted during the 1st extraordinary
session of the 42d legislature, amends R.C.W. 84.04.030 to provide
that:40
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section or of any
other statute, when the value of any taxable leasehold estate
created prior to January 1, 1971 is being determined for assess-
ment years prior to the assessment year 1973, there shall be de-
ducted from what would otherwise be the value thereof the present
worth of the rentals and other consideration which may be required
of the lessee by the lessor for the unexpired term thereof: PRO-
VIDED, That the foregoing provisions of this sentence shall not
apply to any extension or renewal, made after December 31, 1970
of the term of any such estate, or to any such estate after the
date, if any, provided for in the agreement for rental renegotia-
tion.
The new legislation is further intended to facilitate renegotiation of
state leases by authorizing "public lessors", at their option, to agree
to modifications of leases whereby the new tax burden is absorbed by
the public lessor in return for concessions from the lessees on other
terms such as the duration of the lease.41
Following the leading California case, De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County
39. The test to determine who enjoyed economic advantage under the old standard
involves two steps: first, economic rent, that is, the full amount paid for comparable
private leases, must be determined; second, the amount of the new tax burden should
then be subtracted from economic rent to produce a second figure, the value of the lease
exclusive of all tax considerations. Then to the extent the state collected rent in excess
of the second figure it has shared the benefit, and to the extent the lessee paid rent less
than the first figure, or economic rent, it has shared the benefit. This approach has not
yet been used to measure a significant number of leases but the hue and cry raised by
both lessors and lessees in the wake of the principal case suggests that the question of
who benefited is a complicated one differing from case to case.
40. Ch. 43 [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
41. Section 5 of House Bill 493, Ch. 43, § 5, [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.,
provides:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 5. A state agency, municipal corporation, or political sub-
division (hereinafter referred to as "public lessor") which has entered into, prior to
the effective date of the act, as lessor, a lease of real or personal property (including
802
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of. San Diego,2 the California legislature enacted a statute4 3 making
application of the newly approved "no-deduction" rule prospective
only. Leases and sub-leases of exempt property were to come under the
new rule only as they expired and were renegotiated. Thus, uniform
compliance with the "no-deduction" rule was made to await the ex-
piration of the lease with the longest remaining term entered into prior
to the decision in De Luz Homes. The law was subsequently upheld by
the California Supreme Court 4
Washington's legislative response, while providing immediate short-
term relief, avoided the disadvantages of the California approach. Uni-
formity was not unreasonably delayed and, under the authorization to
renegotiate at will, public lessors are encouraged to distinguish between
lessees who are genuinely injured and those who are not. However, the
statute may be subject to the challenge that it violates the state con-
stitution either as a non-uniform and unequal rate of assessment and
taxation,45 or because it constitutes an extension of the state's credit 6
Pier 67, Inc. will no doubt have the desirable long-term effect of
standardizing state lease agreements and assessment standards so that
no one receives an economic bonus at the expense of property tax
revenue. House Bill 493 mitigates the immediate effect of placing an
immense tax burden on lessees of exempt land. It also calls for further
legislative review of methods and procedures used in assessing taxable
leaseholds 7 Because the correctness of Pier 67, Inc. is established by
any permit, concession agreement or other type of agreement essentially comparable
to a lease) may agree to a modification of the provisions of such lease in order to
allow, in whole or in part, the absorption by the public lessor of any property tax
imposed upon the leasehold interest, if the lessee agrees to a suitable modification of
the provisions of such lease with respect to the duration or other terms of such
lease for the benefit of the public lessor; and for the purpose of allowing such modifi-
cations with respect to the duration of the lease a public lessor is authorized, if it
finds it to be beneficial to itself, to extend the term of such lease for a period not to
exceed five years beyond any otherwise applicable statutory limitation.
42. 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955).
43. CAL. REv. & TAX. CoD- § 107.1 (West 1957).
44. Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450, 353 P.2d 736
(1960).
45. See WAsH. CONST. amend. XIV.
46. See WAsr. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 5.
47. Section 4 of House Bill 493, ch. 43, § 4, [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., pro-
vides:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 4. The legislative council in conjunction with the Depart-
ment of Revenue shall review methods and procedures for the assessment and valua-
tion of taxable leasehold estates and shall present recommendations with respect
thereto to the legislature, not later than the next regular session.
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the court's reasoning, and by the prevalence of the no-deduction view
in other jurisdictions, the legislature should now focus on equitable
implementation of the new standard and resist any further attempt to
compromise the effect of the case.
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